当前有关基层政府行为的研究多从组织结构与激励机制出发探究其行动策略，但是，为何处于相同组织结构和激励函数下的地方政府在执行同一任务时依然行为迥异？基于三个街道办在网格化管理政策推行上的行为差异比较，本文提出，尽管面临相同的结构地位和激励函数，但管理任务量的巨大差异、行政资源的平均化配置模式和自致资源获取能力的差别促使三个街道办在面对同一任务时分别采取了按部就班、被动应付和政策悬置三种应对行为。在此基础上，本文提出应将“管理函数”带回基层政府行为的研究，并由此进一步讨论其对国家治理能力的影响。

Previous studies discussed the behaviors of local governments from the perspectives of incentive mechanism and internal organizational structure. There remains a puzzle as why governments, facing the same incentive mechanism and organizational structure, take different actions to an identical task. Based on a comparative case study of three sub-district offices, this research finds that when implementing the grid management policy, each sub-district office carried out different behaviors, including active implementation, passive response, and neglect. Three main factors influenced the strategy of sub-district offices, i.e., the task context, the ability to acquire non-institutionalization resource, and the average allocation of administrative resources. This study also suggests that the management factors should be taken into consideration when researching on the behavior of local governments.

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