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注意力竞争——基于参与观察与多案例的组织学分析

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英文标题: Competing for Attention in the Chinese Bureaucracy
摘要: 中国政府行为的一个特征是注意力的戴帽竞争而非直线竞争,即职能部门本可利用业务指导权开展工作,却选择借助党委政府的权威地位推动工作。本文通过近距离观察司法厅案例,对传统的多委托多任务理论进行带有中国色彩的改造性诠释和竞争性对话,提炼适用于分析戴帽竞争的多委托多任务框架。研究发现,在中国政府内部,多委托方的权威地位迥然有别,呈现三元差序格局。弱委托方单向依赖强势委托方,组内比较而非组间比较。多任务的激励强度首先取决于隶属委托方的权威地位,其次才是量化奖惩程度。这一结构总体内生了注意力的戴帽竞争行为。这种差序结构进一步衍生三个后果:(1)权威地位的“马太效应”;(2)制度创新竞赛;(3)人格化而非法治化的治理方式。总之,这一研究为理解中国政府运作提供了一个重要视角,并对传统的多委托多任务理论有所推进和拓展。
英文摘要: The curvilinear, but not linear competition for attention is a puzzling phenomenon in the Chinese bureaucracy. That is, a functional department promotes its policy by the authority of the Party committees and governments rather than relying on professional guidance. Traditional theory assumes that multiple principals have the same status. They form intergroup comparison and mutual competition. Under the circumstance, multiple principals compete for the agent’s attention by quantitative appraisal and accountability, which induce the agent’s scare attention and low-powered incentive. In this paper, we propose a Chinese ternary hierarchical structure. Multiple principals have different authority status; they form intra-group comparison and one-way dependency. The incentive intensity of multitasking firstly depends on the affiliated principal’s authority status, and then quantitative appraisal and accountability. This hierarchy structure endogenously induces the curvilinear competition for attention and the agent simultaneously has high-powered and low-powered incentive. We further analyze the unexpected consequences of hierarchical structure, such as the Matthew Effect of the authority status, the development dilemma of rational hierarchy and the rule of law.
作者:

练宏;

作者单位: 中山大学中国公共管理研究中心、中山大学政治与公共事务管理学院
期刊: 社会学研究
年.期:页码 2016.4:1-26
中图分类号:
文章编号:
关键词: 注意力竞争;多委托多任务;三元差序格;局政府行为
英文关键词:
项目基金: 国家社科重大项目(12&ZD040、13&ZD041、15&ZDA050)

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