Modes of Governance in the Chinese Bureaucracy: A “control rights” theory

本文借鉴经济学不完全契约和新产权理论的视角,提出一个中国政府内部权威关系的理论模型,将政府各级部门间的控制权概念化为以下三个维度:目标设定权、检查验收权和激励分配权。诸种控制权在中央政府、中间政府、基层政府间的不同分配方式导致迥然不同的政府治理模式,诱发相应的政府行为。这一理论模型为分析中国政府在不同领域、不同阶段的治理结构、权威关系、行为类型及其变化过程提供一个统一的理论框架,并提出相关的分析概念。本文以环保部门的环境政策实施过程的实证研究来解读这一模型,分析其中的权威关系和各种行为的组织基础。

Drawing on insights from recent economic theories of incomplete contracts and property rights，we develop a theoretical model on authority relationships in the Chinese bureaucracy by conceptualizing the allocation of control rights in goal setting， inspection and incentive provision among the principal，supervisor and agent． Variations in the allocation of control rights give rise to different modes of governance and entail distinct behavioral implications among the parties involved． The proposed model provides a unified framework and a set of analytical concepts to examine different governance structures，varying authority relationships，and behavioral patterns in the Chinese bureaucracy． We illustrate the proposed model in a case study of the authority relationships and the ensuing behavioral patterns in the environmental protection arena over a 5-year policy cycle．

周雪光 练宏

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