本文关注中国金融治理中一类特殊的治理波动现象：地方政府对特定金融领域的治理行为常常会经历默许发展、大力推动、清理整顿、善后处置的复杂过程，呈现明显的波动特征。从社会学视角出发，本文建构了“金融市场演变-治理机制切换-政策执行波动”的三层分析框架，力图揭示金融治理波动的过程和机制。研究表明，自下而上的金融市场演变可能会带来自上而下的治理机制切换；自上而下不同的治理机制蕴含着对地方政府的不同激励和约束，可能引发不同的治理行为，使政策执行产生波动；政策执行波动会进而影响金融市场的演变情况。在三个层次的前后关联、相互影响中才能深入理解金融治理波动。

This paper focuses on a special type of fluctuation in China’s financial governance, namely, the financial governance behavior of local governments often undergoes a complex process of tacit approval of development, vigorous promotion, cleanup, and aftermath risk disposal, showing obvious characteristics of fluctuation. From a sociological perspective, this paper constructs a three-level analysis framework of “financial market evolution-governance mechanism switching-policy implementation fluctuation” to reveal the process and mechanism of financial governance fluctuation. The study shows that bottom-up financial market evolution may lead to top-down governance mechanism switching; different top-down governance mechanisms imply different incentives and constraints for local governments, which may lead to different governance behaviors and fluctuations in policy implementation; the fluctuation of policy implementation will in turn affect financial market evolution, and so on. It is in the back-and-forth and interactions among the three layers that financial governance fluctuations can be understood in depth.

本文是国家社会科学基金青年项目“我国网络借贷的地方治理模式研究”（16CSH037）的阶段性成果。

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